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Limiting the National Right to Exclude 
KATRINA M. WYMAN* 
This essay argues that the robust right to exclude that 
nation states currently enjoy will be harder to justify in an 
era of climate change.  Similar to landowners, nation states 
have virtual monopolies over portions of the earth. However, 
the right of landowners to control who enters their land is 
considerably more constrained than the right of nation states 
to control who enters their territory. Climate change will al-
ter the areas of the earth suitable for human habitation and 
the broad right of nation states to exclude will be more dif-
ficult to justify in this new environment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is already contributing to human migration, and 
more people will move around the world for reasons related to cli-
mate change in the future.1 Unfortunately, however, this is not an 
auspicious time to argue that the United States should be planning 
to accept more foreigners affected by climate change. The current 
administration wants to reduce immigration to the United States, in-
cluding the numbers of legal and undocumented immigrants and ref-
ugees.2 One of President Trump’s earliest executive orders sought 
                                                                                                             
 1 See Jessica Benko, How a Warming Planet Drives Human Migration, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/magazine/
how-a-warming-planet-drives-human-migration.html?_r=0; Kelly M. McFarland 
& Vanessa Lide, The Effects of Climate Change Will Force Millions to Migrate. 
Here’s What This Means for Human Security., WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Apr. 
23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/04/23/
the-effects-of-climate-change-will-force-millions-to-migrate-heres-what-this-
means-for-human-security/?utm_term=.4c018560740b; Coral Davenport & 
Campbell Robertson, Resettling the First American ‘Climate Refugees,’ N.Y. 
TIMES (May 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/resettling-the-
first-american-climate-refugees.html?_r=0; Mike Ives, A Remote Pacific Nation, 
Threatened by Rising Seas, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/07/03/world/asia/climate-change-kiribati.html; see also THE NANSEN 
INITIATIVE, AGENDA FOR THE PROTECTION OF CROSS-BORDER DISPLACED 
PERSONS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 6 (2015), 
https://nanseninitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PROTECTION-
AGENDA-VOLUME-1.pdf; PLATFORM ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, http://dis-
asterdisplacement.org/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2017). 
  In saying that climate change is contributing to migration, it is important 
to recognize that migration decisions are driven by multiple factors. Climate 
change is best understood as one of the factors that promote, and will continue to 
promote, migration within and across national boundaries. Although this essay 
focuses on cross-border migration, experts predict that most migration influenced 
by climate change will be internal to countries, especially developing countries. 
See THE GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., LONDON, FORESIGHT: MIGRATION AND GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 4, 9–10 (2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/up-
loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/287717/11-1116-migration-and-
global-environmental-change.pdf. 
 2 See Peter Baker, Trump Supports Plan to Cut Legal Immigration by Half, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/us/poli-
tics/trump-immigration.html; Heather Long, Cutting Legal Immigration 50 Per-
cent Might Be Trump’s Worst Economic Idea, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 17, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/17/cutting-le-
gal-immigration-50-percent-might-be-trumps-worst-economic-policy-yet/?utm_
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to suspend the overseas refugee resettlement program and reduce the 
number of overseas refugees resettled in the United States in 2017.3 
Furthermore, the Trump administration does not appear interested 
in addressing climate change. While the President may “believe[] 
the climate is changing” due to human action,4 his administration 
has announced that the United States will withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement5 and repeal the Clean Power Plan,6 the Obama admin-
istration’s signature effort to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
from power plants. President Trump also proposes to reduce federal 
funding for adapting to climate change, including funding to assist 
impoverished Native Alaskan communities that need to relocate due 
to melting of permafrost, flooding, and erosion induced by climate 
                                                                                                             
term=.70327faf5b99; Eliana Johnson & Josh Dawsey, Trump Crafting Plan to 
Slash Legal Immigration, POLITICO (July 12, 2017, 7:07 PM), http://www.polit-
ico.com/story/2017/07/12/trump-legal-immigration-cuts-240478. 
  Most people who need to move across national borders due to climate 
change will not be considered “refugees” as this term is defined in the Refugee 
Convention, and under United States law, which incorporates the Refugee Con-
vention definition. JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 42–48 (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (2012). 
 3 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). After this 
executive order was blocked in court, the administration revoked it and replaced 
it with Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (March 6, 2017). Shortly 
before a scheduled Supreme Court hearing on the second executive order, the 
President issued Proclamation No. 9654, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Pro-
cesses for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other 
Public-Safety Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017). The Supreme Court 
will hear challenges to this proclamation. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Con-




 4 Rebecca Morin, Does Trump Believe in Climate Change? Nikki Haley Says 
Yes., POLITICO (June 3, 2017, 2:22 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/
03/trump-climate-change-nikki-haley-239097. 
 5 Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agree-
ment, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/
trump-paris-climate-agreement.html. 
 6 See Coral Davenport & Alissa J. Rubin, Trump Signs Executive Order Un-
winding Obama Climate Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/03/28/climate/trump-executive-order-climate-change.html?
mcubz=0; see also Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017); 
Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017). 
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change.7 All of these reversals of Obama-era policies reflect the new 
administration’s efforts to put America’s interests first, which the 
administration defines as mutually exclusive with increasing immi-
gration and dealing proactively with climate change.8 
This essay steps back from the current political landscape and, 
in an era of human-induced climate change, questions the staying 
power of an important assumption that undergirds the current ad-
ministration’s approach to immigration. The Trump administration, 
like many others before it, assumes that the United States has the 
exclusive right to control who enters the United States, much like a 
private property owner controls who enters their land.9 Jeremy Wal-
dron labels his idea—that the state, like a private landowner, has the 
exclusive authority to control entry to its land mass—the “Sovereign 
Ownership conception” of state authority.10 Waldron explains the 
conception as follows: 
Conceiving the sovereign as the owner of [its] terri-
tory, it treats the exclusion of an alien like a property-
owner’s exclusion of an unwelcome guest. After all, 
the right to exclude is the definitive or one of the de-
finitive incidents of ownership. If it works for me and 
my house—its being mine means that I am entitled 
to say who may come in and who is excluded— why 
                                                                                                             
 7 Erica Martinson, Trump Budget Cuts Deeply into Alaska’s Federal Fund-
ing, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.adn.com/poli-
tics/2017/03/16/trumps-budget-cuts-deep-gash-into-alaskas-federal-funding/; 
Naomi Klouda, Denali Commission Directed to Work on Shutdown Plan, ALASKA 
J. COM. (Apr. 5, 2017, 1:13 PM), http://www.alaskajournal.com/2017-04-05/de-
nali-commission-directed-work-shutdown-plan#.WWoOECmQw2w. 
 8 Shear, supra note 5; see also Baker, supra note 2 (Trump said “[t]his leg-
islation demonstrates our compassion for struggling American families who de-
serve an immigration system . . . that puts America first.”). 
 9 See Jeremy Waldron, Exclusion: Property Analogies in the Immigration 
Debate, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 469, 470, 473–74 (2017); see also JOSEPH 
H. CARENS, THE ETHICS OF IMMIGRATION 270–71, 271 n.31 (2013). 
 10 Waldron, supra note 9, at 469–70. 
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does it not also work for a sovereign and the territory 
that the sovereign ‘owns’?11 
Waldron argues that analogizing the state to a private property 
owner does not reach so far as to justify states excluding foreign-
ers.12 First, he sees the analogy between the state’s and the private 
owner’s right to exclude as giving the state the right to exclude other 
states, but not foreign individuals who are on a different plane from 
the state.13 In his view, there is something like a “category mistake” 
in saying that the state has a right to exclude foreign individuals 
from its territory because the state is analogous to a private property 
owner.14 Second, he sees the analogy between the state’s and the 
private property owner’s right to exclude as problematic because 
private property is nested within the state.15 The state and the private 
owner are not two standalone institutions; private property exists 
within the boundaries of the state, and the state can limit the rights 
of private owners.16 
I am sympathetic to Waldron’s effort to undercut the argument 
that the state has the right to exclude individual foreigners based on 
the state’s control of territory. But in this essay, I pursue the idea 
that there is a rough analogy between the positions of the state and 
the private landowner because both have something like a monopoly 
over a geographical space that allows them to control the move-
ments of people. I argue that once we see the state as a monopolist 
controlling access to a land mass similar to a private landowner, the 
robustness of the state’s right to exclude in modern times is strik-
ingly extreme. When we look at property law, we see that limits 
have come to constrain the putative monopoly of the landowner to 
exclude, especially in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as 
                                                                                                             
 11 Id. (footnote omitted); accord CARENS, supra note 9, at 270–71, 271 n.31. 
Carens also considers the analogy between property and sovereignty. Id. Con-
sistent with my argument in this essay, Carens notes that property owners do not 
have an absolute right to exclude. Id. 
 12 See Waldron, supra note 9, at 470. 
 13 Id. at 476–79. 
 14 Id. at 479 n.27. 
 15 Id. at 479–80. 
 16 See id. at 480. 
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populations have increased, societies have become more urban-
ized,17 and the negative effects of allowing landowners to arbitrarily 
exclude have increased.18 By comparison, the authority of the state 
to exclude has not been curtailed to nearly the same degree.19 
The question I want to raise is this: should the state’s robust au-
thority to exclude remain, or should this right to exclude be curtailed 
similar to the way that the landowner’s right to exclude has given 
way to a significant degree? Climate change is altering, and will 
continue to alter, the physical environment of the earth.20 Sea-level 
rise in particular will affect what land is habitable because water will 
cover land where people currently live, making it uninhabitable.21 
Currently, over “10% of the world’s population live in the world’s 
low-elevation coastal zones (a contiguous zone along the coast less 
than 10 m above sea level).”22 Some may be able to adapt without 
                                                                                                             
 17 Graeme Hugo, Future Demographic Change and Its Interactions with Mi-
gration and Climate Change, 21S GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE S21, S28 (2011) (“In 
2010 the world passed an important milestone when the proportion of the global 
population living in urban areas exceeded the number living in rural areas for the 
first time in human history.”). 
 18 See generally Waldron, supra note 9, at 469–80. 
 19 Id. at 479, 481. 
 20 See, e.g., Klouda, supra note 7 (“Newtok[, Alaska,] is becoming a tiny is-
land between the Ningliq River and a sinking bog to the north because of melting 
permafrost attributed to climate change.”). 
 21 See Mathew E. Hauer, Migration Induced by Sea-level Rise Could Reshape 
the US Population Landscape, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 321, 321 (2017) 
(“[Sea-level rise] is unique among environmental stressors as the conversion of 
habitable land to uninhabitable water is expected to lead to widespread human 
migration without the deployment of costly protective infrastructure.”). 
 22 Katherine J. Curtis & Annemarie Schneider, Understanding the Demo-
graphic Implications of Climate Change: Estimates of Localized Population Pre-
dictions Under Future Scenarios of Sea-Level Rise, 33 POPULATION & ENV’T 28, 
29 (2011) (citing Gordon McGranahan et al., The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks 
of Climate Change and Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones, 19 
ENV’T & URBANIZATION 17, 17, 25–26 (2007); BRIAN C. O’NEILL ET AL., 
POPULATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 26–27 (2001)). Curtis & Schneider note that 
“[t]he 10 m low elevation coastal zone defined by McGranahan et al. (2007) rep-
resents an upper bound for defining populations at risk for inundation.” Id. at 29 
n.1. For another estimate of the number of coastal residents vulnerable to sea-level 
rise, see Hauer, supra note 21, at 321 (referring to “up to 180 million people di-
rectly at risk to [sea-level rise] in the world and over 1 billion living in the lower-
elevation coastal zone” (citing Robert J. Nicholls et al., Sea-level Rise and Its 
Possible Impacts Given a ‘Beyond 40C World’ in the Twenty-First Century, 369 
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moving, for instance if governments invest in expensive sea walls; 
many others will need to move.23 Researchers are beginning to ana-
lyze where coastal residents might relocate to,24 and to recognize 
that additional research is needed on the impacts that other “climate 
stressors”—such as temperature increase—could have on where 
people will live.25 A major theme of the existing research is that 
phenomena, such as sea-level rise, will impact not only people in the 
directly affected areas, but also people living in the regions where 
people will relocate to.26 Over time, as the climate changes and al-
ters the physical surface of the earth, the costs of allowing states to 
exclude foreigners will rise and become more visible,27 suggesting 
                                                                                                             
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 161, 161–81 (2011); Barbara Neumann et 
al., Future Coastal Population Growth and Exposure to Sea-Level Rise and 
Coastal Flooding – A Global Assessment, 10 PLOS ONE e0118571 (2015), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/arti-
cles/PMC4367969/pdf/pone.0118571.pdf)). 
 23 See Hauer, supra note 21, at 321–22; see also Charles Geisler & Ben 
Currens, Impediments to Inland Resettlement Under Conditions of Accelerated 
Sea Level Rise, 66 LAND USE POL’Y 322, 323 (2017) (“There is a high likelihood 
that we face a future of less land and more people due to the colliding forces of 
human fertility, an ebbing [low-elevation coastal zone], and the retreat of residents 
from the latter.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Curtis & Schneider, supra note 22 at 46–49; Hauer, supra note 
21, at 324. Both of these articles analyze the possible destinations of people living 
in vulnerable coastal areas in the United States, assuming that people will move 
within the United States. See Curtis & Schneider, supra note 22, at 46–49; Hauer, 
supra note 21, at 324. The path-breaking character of Curtis and Schneider’s and 
Hauer’s work is underscored by Susan Martin’s observation that “[t]here is little 
information about the likely migration corridors—that is, projecting from where 
and to where people will migrate.” SUSAN F. MARTIN, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND MIGRATION: WHAT WE KNOW 7 (2013), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Migration-Devel-
opment-WhatWeKnow.pdf. 
 25 Hauer, supra note 21, at 324 (suggesting that other researchers could use 
his approach to modeling destinations for migrants to analyze destinations for 
people living in the Middle East and North Africa, parts of which “could become 
uninhabitable by the end of the century” (citing Johannes Lelieveld et al., Strongly 
Increasing Heat Extremes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the 
21st Century, 137 CLIMATIC CHANGE 245 (2016)). 
 26 Id.; Curtis & Schneider, supra note 22, at 42–49. 
 27 See THE GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., supra note 1, at 9–10; Curtis & Schneider, 
supra note 22, at 46; Hauer, supra note 21, at 324. 
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that additional limits on the national right to exclude will be justi-
fied. 
Whether the national right to exclude will be limited is a differ-
ent question, of course, from whether it should be limited. Percep-
tions of national interest, ideology, and emotions determine immi-
gration policy in the world,28 and as a law professor based in Green-
wich Village, I am poorly positioned to predict the future. It is pos-
sible that countries will keep their borders closed to foreigners, as 
they did in the 1930s when Jews desperately needed to leave Nazi 
Germany and the countries that it controlled.29 But closing the bor-
ders will probably not always be an option, especially if one’s coun-
try shares a land border with areas that are highly vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change.30 So just as the right of landowners to 
exclude has been curtailed in recent decades, the right of nation-
states to exclude may diminish.31 Our current assumption that states 
have the right to exclude may seem less justifiable and less viable in 
an era of human-induced climate change that reconfigures the envi-
ronment of the planet.32 
This essay proceeds as follows. Part II argues that the state is in 
a roughly similar position to a private landowner and, therefore, that 
the scope of the landowner’s and the state’s right to exclude are 
worth comparing. Part III identifies the categories of limits that exist 
on the right of landowners to exclude and illustrates the striking 
breadth of the state’s right to exclude by comparison. Part IV argues 
that a robust national right to exclude will be harder to justify in the 
new context created by climate change. The essay concludes by ac-
knowledging that right does not necessarily make might, and that 
                                                                                                             
 28 See CARENS, supra note 9, at 1–8. 
 29 See id. at 192–93 (referring to the Evian Conference and to the plight of 
passengers aboard the St. Louis); DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE 
POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA 156–67 (Ira Katznelson et al. 
eds., 2002) (discussing the United States’s response to plight of Jewish refugees); 
JOHN TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP 
AND THE STATE 135–37 (Chris Arup et al. eds., 2000) (discussing the 1938 Evian 
Conference where only the Dominican Republic offered to admit refugees from 
Germany and Austria). 
 30 See CARENS, supra note 9, at 225–54. 
 31 Id. 
 32 For a case for open borders, see id. 
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even though there is a case for relaxing the national right to exclude, 
such relaxation may not occur. 
II. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE PRIVATE 
LANDOWNER 
The idea that the state and the private landowner are analogous 
is not novel.33 Property owners are often described as sovereigns 
within their domain.34 For example, ninety years ago, legal realist 
Morris Cohen published a famous article titled Property and Sover-
eignty, in which he described property as a “sovereign power” and 
emphasized that “we must not overlook the actual fact that dominion 
over things is also imperium over our fellow human beings” because 
of their need for the things that owners control.35 As Waldron’s 
“Sovereign Ownership conception” indicates, state sovereignty is 
also compared to private ownership.36 Going back to feudal times, 
property and sovereignty were deeply intertwined because, as Co-
hen put it, “[o]wnership of the land and local political sovereignty 
were inseparable” in the hands of the “feudal baron.”37 
                                                                                                             
 33 See, e.g., CARENS, supra note 9, at 270–71, 271 n.31; Waldron, supra note 
9, at 469–70. 
 34 See Waldron, supra note 9, at 477–79. 
 35 Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12–13 
(1927). More recently, leading property theorists Thomas Merrill and Henry 
Smith have also suggested that property owners are like sovereigns. See, e.g., 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 
54 J.L. & ECON. S77, S95 (2011) (“[B]ecause of transaction costs, we delegate to 
owners a range of sovereign authority over their property, with a presumptive 
right to repel invasions through some combination of self-help and litiga-
tion . . . .”). 
 36 Waldron, supra note 9, at 469–70; see also Peter H. Schuck, The Transfor-
mation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1984) (“[T]he classical idea 
of sovereignty implied a relationship between government and an alien that re-
sembled the relationship in late nineteenth century private law between a land-
owner and a trespasser.”). 
 37 Cohen, supra note 35, at 9 (“The essence of feudal law . . . is the insepara-
ble connection between land tenure and personal homage involving often rather 
menial services on the part of the tenant and always genuine sovereignty by the 
landlord. The feudal baron had, for instance, the right to determine the marriage 
of the ward, as well as the right to nominate the priest . . . . Likewise was the 
administration of justice in the baron’s court an incident of landownership . . . .”). 
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There are several reasons for analogizing the positions of the 
private landowner and the state sovereign today, even if the analogy 
is imperfect. Both the state and the private property owner have vir-
tual monopolies on land, a resource to which every human needs 
some access because, as Waldron explains in his work on homeless-
ness, “we are embodied beings.”38 That control over land gives the 
state and the private owner control not only over the inanimate ob-
jects on land, but also over the people who want access to the land.39 
The private owner “owns” the land mass under their control and has 
a right to exclude other individuals and entities—including often-
times the government—from entering that land.40 The state controls 
access to the land mass within its borders by determining who can 
cross into the state through its borders. It may own large amounts of 
that land outright and so be a sovereign and an owner; the federal 
government owns roughly thirty percent of the land mass of the 
United States.41 A good deal of the rest of the land within the United 
States and most Western democracies is privately owned, subject to 
regulation by governments. In contemporary societies with well-
functioning states, private landownership is a governance arrange-
ment, under which the state decentralizes control over land to indi-
viduals close to the ground, and therefore well-placed to use the 
land, while retaining some residual authority to intervene to address 
issues beyond the ken of individual landowners.42 The key point of 
convergence between the state and the private landowner is that both 
control individual access to land.43 Indeed, the right to exclude oth-
ers is often described by courts as the, or an, essential element of 
private property and state sovereignty.44 
                                                                                                             
 38 Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. 
REV. 295, 296 (1991) (“Everything that is done has to be done somewhere. No 
one is free to perform an action unless there is somewhere he is free to perform it. 
Since we are embodied beings, we always have a location.”). 
 39 See id. at 296, 301. 
 40 Id. at 296–97. 
 41 THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 106 (3d ed. 2017). 
 42 See Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal Pri-
vate Property Rights Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2042–47 
(2012). 
 43 See id. at 2047. 
 44 On the significance of the right to exclude for property, see, for example, 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (“In this case, we 
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Another reason for analogizing the state to a private property 
owner is that similar justifications are given for granting states and 
                                                                                                             
hold that the ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element 
of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government 
cannot take without compensation.” (footnote omitted)); see also Thomas W. 
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) 
(“[T]he right to exclude others is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ con-
stituents of property—it is the sine qua non.”). On the significance of the right to 
exclude for state sovereignty, see Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese 
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889) (“That the government of the 
United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens 
from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Ju-
risdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent 
nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to 
that extent subject to the control of another power. As said by this court in the 
case of [The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812)], 
speaking by Chief Justice Marshall: ‘The jurisdiction of the nation within its own 
territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not 
imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external 
source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, 
and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could 
impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power 
of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation 
itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.’”); Nishimura Ekiu v. 
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“It is an accepted maxim of international 
law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and 
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its do-
minions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may 
see fit to prescribe.” (citing EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF 
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS §§ 94, 120 (1797); 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, 
COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW § 220 (3d ed. 1879))); United States 
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (“The exclusion of aliens 
is a fundamental act of sovereignty.”); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 
2511 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (“As a sovereign, Arizona has 
the inherent power to exclude persons from its territory, subject only to those lim-
itations expressed in the Constitution or constitutionally imposed by Congress. 
That power to exclude has long been recognized as inherent in sovereignty. Emer 
de Vattel’s seminal 1758 treatise on the Law of Nations stated: ‘The sovereign 
may forbid the entrance of his territory either to foreigners in general, or in par-
ticular cases, or to certain persons, or for certain particular purposes, according as 
he may think it advantageous to the state.’” (quoting VATTEL, supra note 44, 
§ 94)). 
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private property owners control over access to land.45 Private prop-
erty is often justified on the basis that control over things is neces-
sary to achieve self-actualization as a person.46 This idea that con-
trolling a thing, such as the land where I live, gives me the space to 
realize my goals and actualize my identity is associated historically 
with Hegel47 and more recently with Margaret Radin.48 By furnish-
ing my house, controlling who enters it, and choosing the plants for 
my garden, I can implement my agenda for my life. 
The idea that physical things are necessary for self-actualization 
has a parallel for states.49 Statehood is said to require a land mass on 
the basis that collectives need territory to realize their right to self-
determination, the collective version of self-actualization.50 The 
state’s territory helps it develop an identity that binds its members.51 
Land is a source of cultural memory; individuals and groups associ-
ate events with specific parcels of land.52 For example, consider the 
sites that nations memorialize by putting up plaques—sites of his-
torical battles or birthplaces of well-known historical figures—or 
the lands, like national seashores, that states set aside. States memo-
rialize these sites and set aside these lands to create spaces for people 
to commune with nature and one another. Territorial control also 
enables states to regulate their membership.53 As sociologist John 
                                                                                                             
 45 See Sarah Song, Why Does the State Have the Right to Control Immigra-
tion?, in NOMOS LVII: IMMIGRATION, EMIGRATION AND MIGRATION 7, 11–13 
(Jack Knight ed., 2017) (discussing arguments for why the state has “the right to 
control immigration”). 
 46 See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 47 See G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT para. 41, at 48 (S.W. Dyde 
trans., 1896) (“A person must give to his freedom an external sphere, in order that 
he may reach the completeness implied in the idea.”); see also Alan Ryan, Hegel 
on Work, Ownership and Citizenship, in THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: STUDIES 
IN HEGEL’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 178, 185–87 (Z.A. Pelczynski ed., 1984). 
 48 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 
(1982) (“The premise underlying the personhood perspective is that to achieve 
proper self-development—to be a person—an individual needs some control over 
resources in the external environment.”). 
 49 See Song, supra note 45, at 32–43. 
 50 See id. 
 51 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY 44 (1983) (“[T]he link between people and land is a crucial feature of 
national identity.”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 42–44. 
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Torpey explains in his history of the passport, states “are territorial 
and membership organizations that must thus be able to distinguish 
between members and non-members, those with rights of access to 
the territory and those lacking them.”54 Or to quote President Trump, 
“a nation without borders is not a nation.”55 
There also are prudential reasons for private property and for 
allocating spaces of the earth to states. Private property helps to 
avoid the tragedy of the commons.56 An owner would have little in-
centive to nourish her land if she could not exclude others from reap-
ing where she sows. The right to exclude motivates the landowner 
to invest in her land because the owner knows that she will reap what 
she has sown. Also, the private owner suffers the consequences of 
leaving the land untended, such as the decline in its value. 
By extension, the state’s territorial control enables it to avoid the 
tragedy of the commons on a larger scale than the private owner. 
While private property owners internalize the costs and benefits of 
actions that affect their parcels, private owners have little incentive 
to consider the costs (or benefits) that their actions confer on oth-
ers.57 Thus, a farmer takes into account the income she generates 
from selling the crops that she grows, but not the water pollution to 
which her farming contributes miles downstream.58 The state ad-
dresses larger scale externalities like the water pollution by regulat-
                                                                                                             
 54 TORPEY, supra note 29, at 43. 
 55 Bill Chappell et al., ‘A Nation Without Borders Is Not a Nation’: Trump 
Moves Forward with U.S.-Mexico Wall, NPR (Jan. 25, 2017, 7:07 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/25/511565740/trump-ex-
pected-to-order-building-of-u-s-mexico-wall-wednesday. 
 56 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1245 
(1968); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347, 348, 351–53 (1967). 
 57 Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1323–32 
(1993) (analyzing the extent to which private property internalizes events of dif-
ferent scales). 
 58 See Demsetz, supra note 56, at 348 (“What converts a harmful or beneficial 
effect into an externality is that the cost of bringing the effect to bear on the deci-
sions of one or more of the interacting persons is too high to make it worth-
while . . . .”); see also Hardin, supra note 56, at 1245 (“The rational man finds 
that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than 
the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them.”). 
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ing the activities of landowners and, in so doing, forces them to in-
ternalize costs and benefits that they might otherwise avoid.59 The 
state is motivated to address externalities because it reaps the bene-
fits of dealing with these issues because the state can exclude for-
eigners from its land mass.60 The difficulty of immigrating also in-
centivizes states and citizens to deal with national-scale externalities 
because it is not easy to move to another country in the case of state 
failure.61 
To be sure, there are differences between the state and the pri-
vate landowner; the analogy is not perfect. In developed countries 
with strong states, states and private landowners are in a hierarchical 
relationship in which states are superior to private landowners; in 
other words, the state is higher in the food chain than landowners.62 
For example, the state has authority to regulate private lands63 and 
even potentially to take those lands through eminent domain.64 Still, 
                                                                                                             
 59 See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 38–39 (1999) (“An important role 
of a people’s government, however arbitrary a society’s boundaries may appear 
from a historical point of view, is to be the representative and effective agent of a 
people as they take responsibility for their territory and its environmental integ-
rity, as well as for the size of their population. As I see it the point of the institution 
of property is that, unless a definite agent is given responsibility for maintaining 
an asset and bears the loss for not doing so, that asset tends to deteriorate. In this 
case the asset is the people’s territory and its capacity to support them in perpetu-
ity; and the agent is the people themselves as politically organized.”). 
 60 See VATTEL, supra note 44, § 94 (“The sovereign may forbid the entrance 
of his territory either to foreigners in general, or in particular cases, or to certain 
persons, or for certain particular purposes, according as he may think it advanta-
geous to the state.” (emphasis added)). 
 61 See WALZER, supra note 51, at 50–51; see CARENS, supra note 9, at 262–
63 (summarizing what Carens calls “the state responsibility thesis” of Miller and 
Rawls for the right to exclude); see also DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 73 (2007). 
 62 Thank you to Yael Lifshitz for suggesting the “food chain” analogy. See 
also Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 371–
73 (1954). 
 63 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) 
(holding a municipal corporation’s comprehensive zoning ordinance constitu-
tional as “a valid exercise of authority”); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 
U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (“[T]he authority of state and local governments to engage 
in land use planning has been sustained against constitutional challenge as long 
ago as our decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.” (citation omitted)). 
 64 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
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the state’s authority to regulate and expropriate is not unlimited be-
cause of the constitutional protections for private property. Another 
manifestation of the state’s higher status is the state’s monopoly on 
the means of violence. This monopoly means that the private land-
owner’s right to exclude other private individuals ultimately de-
pends on the state’s willingness to enforce the landowner’s right to 
exclude.65 Landowners themselves do not have unlimited authority 
to use force to defend their boundaries against trespassers; landown-
ers may have to call on the police and the courts.66 
III. THE LIMITS ON LANDOWNERS BUT NOT USUALLY ON 
STATES 
While states and private landowners both control access to de-
fined areas of the earth, there is a striking difference between the 
degrees of control enjoyed by states relative to the control exerted 
by private landowners.67 Put simply, the authority of landowners to 
exclude individuals is more limited than the state’s.68 The state has 
been much more willing to limit the authority of private landowners 
within its jurisdiction to exclude than it has been to subject its own 
authority to exclude to international—or domestic—legal re-
strictions.69 The limits on the private landowner’s right to exclude 
                                                                                                             
public use, without just compensation.”); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (“[I]t is . . . clear that a State may transfer property from 
one private party to another . . . .”). 
 65 Cohen, supra note 62, at 372–74. 
 66 See id. at 372. Theoretically, the state has the ability to exclude trespass-
ers—i.e. “illegal aliens”—from its land mass without societal support for its pol-
icies, given the state’s monopoly on the means of violence. But here again there 
are limits on the state’s authority to go its own way. Just as the private landowner 
needs the state to back up their right to exclude, so the state depends on the will-
ingness of individuals within society to comply with the state’s decisions about 
who should be admitted. As the Trump Administration is learning in its battles 
with “sanctuary cities,” individuals and other levels of authority may frustrate the 
federal government’s efforts to exclude foreigners. Tessa Stuart, How Sanctuary 
Cities Are Plotting to Resist Trump, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 1, 2016), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/how-sanctuary-cities-are-plotting-
to-resist-trump-w453239. 
 67 See Cohen, supra note 62, at 374. 
 68 See id. 
 69 Cf. WALZER, supra note 51, at 50. 
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and the comparatively unconstrained authority of the state to ex-
clude are both manifestations of the political dominance of the na-
tion-state in today’s state system.70 
Consider three categories of limitations on the landowner’s right 
to exclude and the limited extent to which there are parallels on the 
state’s right to exclude foreigners.71 
A. Necessity-Based Limits 
One longstanding limit on the owner’s right to exclude is the 
right of an individual to come onto the land of another to save their 
life or property when in imminent danger.72 This private right of ne-
cessity in emergencies is exemplified in Ploof v. Putnam, a Vermont 
Supreme Court decision from the early twentieth century.73 The 
Ploofs were out on their sloop on Lake Champlain in Vermont when 
a storm arose.74 To save themselves, they tried to secure themselves 
and their sloop to a dock on a privately owned island in the lake.75 
But the servant of the island’s owner detached their sloop, and the 
Ploofs consequently were hurt and their sloop was damaged.76 Af-
firming that the Ploofs had a right to use the property of the island 
owner in the face of imminent danger, the court allowed the Ploofs 
to sue the servant’s employer for trespass.77 
The more famous decision in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transporta-
tion Co. addressed the question of what happens if someone, to save 
                                                                                                             
 70 See TORPEY, supra note 29, at 93, 155–57. 
 71 I am focusing on restrictions on landowners’ right to exclude, not re-
strictions on the right to use land. So, I do not discuss land use regulations, such 
as zoning. There is one notable limitation on the right of states to exclude that 
does not apply to private landowners: “all democratic states, even states that do 
not see themselves as countries of immigration, recognize moral obligations to 
admit noncitizens who are immediate members of the family of a current citizen 
or resident.” CARENS, supra note 9, at 185. In 1984, Peter Schuck argued, opti-
mistically, that a new communitarian ethos seemed to be taking hold in immigra-
tion law, influenced by developments in the private law of contracts and torts. See 
Schuck, supra note 36, at 51. Decades later, I am suggesting that the evolution 
Schuck was observing somehow stalled. 
 72 Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908). 
 73 Id. at 188. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 188–89. 
 77 Id. at 189–90. 
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their property, uses the property of another and damages it: must the 
necessitous trespasser pay the property owner damages for the 
harm?78 The court held that the owner of a ship that had remained 
docked during a storm had to pay the dock owner for the damages 
that the ship had caused to the dock.79 But echoing Ploof, Vincent 
insisted that the ship’s crew had done nothing wrong in using some-
one else’s property to save the ship during a storm.80 Still, the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota affirmed the defendants’ liability even 
though the ship’s crew acted “prudently and advisedly . . . for the 
purpose of preserving its own more valuable property.”81 
There are several rationales for giving someone whose life or 
property is in danger the right to use the land or other property of 
another to protect themselves, but I want to highlight one, invoked 
                                                                                                             
 78 124 N.W. 221, 221 (Minn. 1910). 
 79 Id. at 222. 
 80 Id. at 221–22. 
 81 Id. at 222. What I term a “right” of necessity is often called a privilege, and 
in light of Vincent, an “incomplete privilege.” See Stephen D. Sugarman, Vincent 
v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.: Liability for Harm Caused by Necessity, in 
TORTS STORIES 259, 282 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003) 
(tracing the analysis of necessity as an “incomplete privilege” to Professor Francis 
Bohlen). I am discussing the doctrine of private necessity; there is a separate doc-
trine of public necessity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1965). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS refers to private necessity as 
a privilege: 
(1) One is privileged to enter or remain on land in the posses-
sion of another if it is or reasonably appears to be necessary to 
prevent serious harm to 
(a) the actor, or his land or chattels, or 
(b) the other or a third person, or the land or chattels of either, 
unless the actor knows or has reason to know that the one for 
whose benefit he enters is unwilling that he shall take such ac-
tion. 
(2) Where the entry is for the benefit of the actor or a third per-
son, he is subject to liability for any harm done in the exercise 
of the privilege stated in Subsection (1) to any legally protected 
interest of the possessor in the land or connected with it, except 
where the threat of harm to avert which the entry is made is 
caused by the tortious conduct or contributory negligence of the 
possessor. 
Id. § 197. Sugarman also notes that there is Anglo-Canadian case law holding, 
contrary to Vincent, that someone using another’s property in the case of a neces-
sity is not liable for the damage. Sugarman, supra note 81, at 276–77. 
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at least as far back as Thomas Aquinas, that also justifies limiting 
the national right to exclude foreigners in exigent circumstances.82 
Private property might be regarded as a tool introduced to enhance 
individual welfare; as mentioned above, one of the justifications for 
private land ownership is avoidance of the tragedy of the commons 
and encouragement of investment.83 But when private property 
threatens individual welfare, as it would if landowners were allowed 
to force people like the Ploofs to remain on a lake in a middle of a 
storm, then private property rights must give way to the ultimate 
reason that they exist—to promote individual welfare.84 This logic 
easily transfers to the national level. 
The allocation of the earth to states can be justified as a means 
of promoting individual welfare.85 As mentioned above, through 
public landownership and the regulation of privately owned land, 
states are well-placed to avoid large-scale tragedies of the commons 
that exceed the authority of private landowners to address.86 But the 
allocation of land to states can threaten individual welfare in some 
circumstances.87 If nations have the right to exclude individuals at 
risk of imminent death, then the welfare-enhancing purpose of the 
allocation would be undermined.88 So an analogue to the right of 
necessity in private law would seem to be justified to override the 
right of states to exclude foreigners in peril.89 
Indeed, international law does limit the right of states to exclude 
individuals at risk of imminent harm, although not comprehensively, 
                                                                                                             
 82 See Sugarman, supra note 81, at 275 (discussing Aquinas’s contention that 
extreme necessity allows one to take and use another’s property). 
 83 See Demsetz, supra note 56, at 348. 
 84 See GEORG CAVALLAR, THE RIGHTS OF STRANGERS 66–67, 239 (2002); 
Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff, Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations: An 
Introductory Essay, in WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE SHAPING OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY IN THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 1, 26–27 (Istvan Hont & Michael 
Ignatieff eds., 1983); John Salter, Grotius and Pufendorf on the Right of Necessity, 
26 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 284, 284–85 (2005). 
 85 Cf. Hont & Ignatieff, supra note 84, at 26–27. 
 86 See, e.g., Hardin, supra note 56, at 1245. 
 87 See, e.g., TORPEY, supra note 29, at 131–43; WALZER, supra note 51, at 
50–51. 
 88 Cf. CARENS, supra note 9, at 192–93; WALZER, supra note 51, at 48–51. 
 89 WALZER, supra note 51, at 48–51; Mathias Risse, The Right to Relocation: 
Disappearing Island Nations and Common Ownership of the Earth, 23 ETHICS & 
INT’L AFF. 281, 281 (2009). 
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in all cases of necessity, where human life is at risk; we see pockets 
of protections for individuals who find themselves in imminent dan-
ger.90 Under the Refugee Convention, as modified by the 1967 Pro-
tocol, an individual outside their home country with a “well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion”91 can-
not be “expel[led] or return[ed]” to a country “where his life or free-
dom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, national-
ity, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”92 
Several international human rights treaties also provide individuals 
a complementary right of non-refoulement (a right not to be re-
turned) to another country “where they risk certain ill-treatment.”93 
Sailors who find themselves caught in a storm also enjoy a right to 
a safe haven in the ports of foreign countries.94 The domestic laws 
                                                                                                             
 90 See, e.g., Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]; Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
Regional arrangements in some parts of the world have broader definitions of 
“refugee” and therefore may protect some people who may not qualify under the 
Refugee Convention. 
 91 Refugee Convention, supra note 90, art. 1; see also 1967 Protocol, supra 
note 90, art. 1. 
 92 Refugee Convention, supra note 90, art. 1, ¶ 1. 
 93 VIKRAM ODEDRA KOLMANNSKOG, NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, 
FUTURE FLOODS OF REFUGEES: A COMMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CONFLICT 
AND FORCED MIGRATION 28 (2008), https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/re-
ports/future-floods-of-refugees.pdf; see also, e.g., Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. New Zealand jurisprudence is at the cutting 
edge in elaborating the implications of complementary protection frameworks for 
people seeking to leave their home countries due in part to climate change. See 
Jane McAdam, The Emerging New Zealand Jurisprudence on Climate Change, 
Disasters and Displacement, 3 MIGRATION STUD. 131, 133–34 (2015). 
 94 See Christopher F. Murray, Note, Any Port in a Storm? The Right of Entry 
for Reasons of Force Majeure or Distress in the Wake of the Erika and the Castor, 
63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1465, 1466, 1473 (2002); see also John T. Oliver, Legal and 
Policy Factors Governing the Imposition of Conditions on Access to and Juris-
diction over Foreign-Flag Vessels in U.S. Ports, 5 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 209, 
210 (2009); but see Lena E. Whitehead, No Port in a Storm – A Review of Recent 
History and Legal Concepts Resulting in the Extinction of Ports of Refuge, 58 
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of some countries go further and provide additional protections to 
people requiring a safe haven.95 For example, the United States Im-
migration and Nationality Act provides for “temporary protected 
status,” a discretionary form of protection.96 It allows the Secretary 
of Homeland Security to designate foreign countries suffering from 
environmental disasters or other conditions;97 nationals of these 
countries who are in the United States at the time of the designation 
are then entitled to remain in the United States temporarily, even if 
the nationals previously were in the United States illegally.98 
Still, the various international and domestic legislative provi-
sions do not add up to a comprehensive right to enter and remain in 
the territory of another country due to an imminent threat to life 
comparable to the right that necessity provides against the private 
landowner. As an example, and as implied in the definition quoted 
above, to be considered a refugee, one has to already be outside 
one’s home country, facing a well-founded fear of persecution, and 
that fear of persecution must be for one or more of five listed 
grounds.99 The gaps in the scope of the international—and domes-
tic—protections have been highlighted in recent literature arguing 
that additional legal protections are needed to assist people who will 
be displaced by the effects of climate change.100 In one particularly 
                                                                                                             
NAVAL L. REV. 65, 65 (2009) (arguing that this safe haven for sailors is no longer 
a universally accepted premise). It has been suggested that state obligations to-
ward persons in distress at sea are a precedent for the idea that states are obligated 
to foreign victims of sea-level rise. See Stephen Tully, The Contribution of Human 
Rights as an Additional Perspective on Climate Change Impacts Within the Pa-
cific, 5 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 169, 184–87 (2007); see also Katrina Miriam Wy-
man, Sinking States, in PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES 448 n.29 
(Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2011) (referring to these sources and 
Tully). 
 95 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2012). 
 96 See id. 
 97 § 1254a(b)(1). 
 98 § 1254a(a). 
 99 See Refugee Convention, supra note 90, art. 1; see also 1967 Protocol, su-
pra note 90, art. 1. 
 100 See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 24, at 7; Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, 
Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect 
Climate Refugees, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 60, 78 (2010); Bonnie Docherty & 
Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Cli-
mate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 357–61 (2009); David 
Hodgkinson et al., ‘The Hour When the Ship Comes In’: A Convention for Persons 
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novel proposal, political theorist Mathias Risse argues that individ-
ual inhabitants of the island nations whose continued existence is 
threatened by the effects of climate change should have a right to 
relocate to other countries, based on something like a right of neces-
sity.101 Invoking Grotius, Risse argues that the earth notionally be-
longs to all humans because none of us created it, and each of us 
needs its resources.102 When state borders become a hindrance to 
human self-preservation, those borders must give way, much as the 
landowner’s fence should not prevent someone whose life is in dan-
ger from using the land to save themselves.103 Risse’s proposal un-
derscores how far existing international and domestic law are from 
providing a comprehensive right to safe haven if one is facing im-
minent peril in one’s home country.104 
B. Anti-Discrimination Limits 
The landowner’s right to exclude is not only curtailed in the case 
of necessity, but also to reduce discrimination. While private land-
owners retain a broad right to determine who is allowed onto their 
land, the right of landowners to exclude is severely constrained if 
they are public accommodations such as inns, stores, or restau-
rants.105 As a matter of common law, public accommodations are 
required to provide “reasonable access” to all members of the pub-
lic; they are allowed to “exclude from their premises those whose 
actions ‘disrupt the regular and essential operations of the [prem-
ises].’”106 Under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, businesses 
                                                                                                             
Displaced by Climate Change, 36 MONASH U. L. REV. 69, 75–76 (2010); see also 
THE NANSEN INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 6. 
 101 Risse, supra note 89, at 285, 293–94. 
 102 Id. at 284–89. 
 103 Id. at 285. 
 104 Id. at 296. 
 105 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 41, at 373–74. With respect to the position 
of the private landowner, Merrill and Smith explain that “even to this day, there 
is no general legal principle that prohibits a homeowner or tenant from announc-
ing that persons of a particular race or other protected category will be systemat-
ically excluded from her home or apartment. To that extent, a significant degree 
of owner sovereignty remains immune from antidiscrimination duties.” Id. at 392. 
The Supreme Court has never held that a court’s application of trespass doctrine 
to a discriminating property owner is prohibited state action. Id. at 403. 
 106 Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 375 (N.J. 1982) (alteration 
in original) (quoting State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 631 (N.J. 1980)). 
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meeting the statute’s definition of “public accommodations” cannot 
exclude individuals based on their “race, color, religion or national 
origin.”107 Many states and local governments have anti-discrimina-
tion statutes or ordinances that even further curtail the authority of 
public accommodations to exclude, including by prohibiting dis-
crimination based on grounds not listed in Title II such as sexual 
orientation.108 
                                                                                                             
 107 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012) (“All persons shall be entitled to the full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and ac-
commodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, 
without discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”). 
Public accommodations are defined as follows: 
Each of the following establishments which serves the public is 
a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this 
subchapter if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimina-
tion or segregation by it is supported by State action: 
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides 
lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located 
within a building which contains not more than five rooms for 
rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of 
such establishment as his residence; 
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda 
fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for 
consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any 
such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; 
or any gasoline station; 
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, 
stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and 
(4) any establishment (A)(i) which is physically located within 
the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this 
subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically 
located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds 
itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment. 
§ 2000a(b). 
 108 See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a) (McKinney 2016) (“It shall be an 
unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, propri-
etor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accom-
modation, resort or amusement, because of the race, creed, color, national origin, 
sexual orientation, military status, sex, or disability or marital status of any person, 
directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the 
accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof . . . .”); New York 
City Commission on Human Rights, N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN CODE tit. 8, ch. 1, § 8-
107(4)(a) (2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/Updated%
20NYCHRL%206.12.17.pdf (“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for 
any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or 
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Limits on the authority of public accommodations to exclude re-
flect societal commitments to equal treatment.109 Historically, there 
also may have been an economic rationale for the common law re-
striction on the authority of public accommodations to exclude.110 
According to one theory, the duty to serve historically was imposed 
on some businesses but not others because those businesses were 
monopolies, and thus the duty was a means of regulating monopoly 
power.111 
States are similar to “public accommodations” because they 
open their borders for trade, including trade with other nations and 
foreigners who travel to buy and sell goods and services, and for 
tourists to simply visit.112 The commitments to equality and con-
                                                                                                             
employee of any place or provider of public accommodation because of the actual 
or perceived race, creed, color, national origin, age, gender, disability, marital sta-
tus, partnership status, sexual orientation or alienage or citizenship status of any 
person directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any 
of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof . . . .”). These 
state and local laws also may cover more actors than Title II because these laws 
may define public accommodations more expansively. 
 109 See TICHENOR, supra note 29, at 215 (Vice President Hubert Humphrey 
stated: “We have removed all elements of second-class citizenship from our laws 
by the Civil Rights Act.”). 
 110 See James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnec-
tion, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 254–56 (2002). 
 111 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 41, at 374–75 (excerpting Speta, supra note 
110, at 255–56). I am referencing Bruce Wyman’s theory (no relation), mentioned 
in the text included in Merrill and Smith. 
 112 I say that states are “similar,” not identical, because, unlike the businesses 
that are deemed “public accommodations,” states are not in the business of mak-
ing money. Alternatively, states might be analogized to clubs, because states are 
membership organizations who choose their members; indeed, Walzer briefly 
analogizes states to clubs, but then rejects the analogy. WALZER, supra note 51, 
at 40–41. Some clubs are covered by antidiscrimination laws while others are not. 
Title II does not prohibit discrimination by “private clubs.” See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000a(e). The New York State Human Rights Law does not apply to “distinctly 
private” clubs but the statute also states that 
[i]n no event shall an institution, club or place of accommoda-
tion be considered in its nature distinctly private if it has more 
than one hundred members, provides regular meal service and 
regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facili-
ties, services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or 
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cerns about monopoly power that undergird restrictions on the au-
thority of public accommodations to exclude certainly transfer to the 
state level. Liberalism understands individuals as deserving of equal 
treatment by the state because of their humanity.113 States are mo-
nopolists in the sense that they control territory for which there is 
not always an adequate substitute. Think of a Mexican victim of 
gang violence114––the United States may be the only jurisdiction to 
which he or she can flee on foot to escape the violence. 
But reflecting the breadth of state authority to exclude, interna-
tional law imposes no comparable restrictions on the authority of 
states to discriminate in making admissions decisions. Domestic law 
may internally restrict countries from discriminating on some 
                                                                                                             
on behalf of a nonmember for the furtherance of trade or busi-
ness. An institution, club, or place of accommodation which is 
not deemed distinctly private pursuant to this subdivision may 
nevertheless apply such selective criteria as it chooses in the use 
of its facilities, in evaluating applicants for membership and in 
the conduct of its activities, so long as such selective criteria do 
not constitute discriminatory practices under this article or any 
other provision of law. 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 2016). The New York City Human Rights 
Law also does not apply to “distinctly private” clubs, providing that “A club shall 
not be considered in its nature distinctly private if it has more than four hundred 
members, provides regular meal service and regularly receives payment for dues, 
fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly 
from or on behalf of non-members for the furtherance of trade or business.” New 
York City Commission on Human Rights, N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN CODE tit. 8, ch. 
1, § 8-102(9) (2017). However, the City ordinance has an exemption from the 
exemption: “No club which sponsors or conducts any amateur athletic contest or 
sparring exhibition and advertises or bills such contest or exhibition as a New 
York state championship contest or uses the words “New York State” in its an-
nouncement shall be deemed a private exhibition within the meaning of this sec-
tion.” Id. 
 113 Schuck, supra note 36, at 2, 7, 49 (referring to the implications of the lib-
eral tradition for immigration policy). 
 114 Reuters, Mexico: Surge in Drug Gang Violence Leaves 35 Dead in One 
Weekend, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2017, 12:27 AM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2017/apr/24/mexico-surge-in-drug-gang-violence-leaves-35-
dead-in-one-weekend; Kirk Semple, Fleeing Gangs, Central American Families 
Surge Toward U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
11/13/world/americas/fleeing-gangs-central-american-families-surge-toward-
us.html?mcubz=0. 
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grounds, such as race or religion.115 The United States Immigration 
and Nationality Act prohibits discrimination in the issuance of im-
migrant visas “because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place 
of birth, or place of residence.”116 As the Ninth Circuit recently 
noted, this provision became law in 1965, when Congress legislated 
landmark immigration reform abolishing the racially discriminatory 
national origins quota system created in the 1920s.117 Passed the 
year after Title II barring discrimination by public accommoda-
tions,118 the 1965 immigration reform was of a piece with other civil 
rights reforms of that period.119 By its own wording, however, the 
                                                                                                             
 115 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012). 
 116 § 1152(a)(1)(A) (“Except as specifically provided in paragraph (2) and in 
sections 1101(a)(27), 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), and 1153 of this title, no person shall re-
ceive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an 
immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or 
place of residence.”). 
 117 Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 776 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 874 F.3d 
1112 (9th Cir. 2017) (mem.). The 1952 McCarran-Walter Act retained a racially 
restrictive immigration regime, but, in what “the bill’s sponsors viewed as a ges-
ture of egalitarian tokenism,” “established that ‘the right of a person to become a 
naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of 
race or sex or because such person is married.’” TICHENOR, supra note 29, at 196. 
This prohibition on discrimination in naturalization later “help[ed] make Asian 
and Latin American immigrants an important political force in the United States.” 
Id. 
 118 Trump, 859 F.3d at 776 (“Contemporaneous to enacting the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress passed the INA of 
1965 . . . .”); see also CARENS, supra note 9, at 174 (“It is important to remember 
that countries like Canada, the United States, and Australia have all used explicitly 
racial criteria to exclude potential immigrants in the past. These criteria were not 
officially abandoned until the 1960s.” (footnote omitted)). 
 119 The national origins system stringently capped the overall number of im-
migrants, assigned quotas of immigrants to countries based on the origins of the 
American population to preserve its existing racial cast, and prohibited immigra-
tion from an “Asiatic barred zone.” TICHENOR, supra note 29, at 145–46. In 1965, 
Vice President Hubert Humphrey stated: “We have removed all elements of sec-
ond-class citizenship from our laws by the Civil Rights Act . . . . We must in 1965 
remove all elements in our immigration law which suggest that there are second-
class people . . . . We want to bring our immigration law into line with the spirit 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id. at 215. Presidents Truman, Kennedy and 
Johnson and other immigration law reformers emphasized the links between elim-
inating the national origins system at the heart of U.S. immigration policy, civil 
rights for African-Americans, and American foreign policy goals during the Cold 
War. See id. at 194–98, 208, 213, 215. 
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prohibition applies only to discrimination in the issuance of “immi-
grant visa[s]” and does not prohibit discrimination in every aspect 
of the admission process, such as the issuance of nonimmigrant vi-
sas.120 
Then, there are constitutional limitations on the ability of the 
federal government to discriminate in making admissions decisions. 
The scope of these limitations is currently at issue in the United 
States in the challenges to the administration’s “travel ban” on Es-
tablishment Clause grounds.121 It is very difficult for non-citizens 
outside the United States to challenge admissions decisions, such as 
the denial of a visa, on constitutional grounds because they are re-
garded as lacking standing.122 But United States citizens, green card 
holders, and states have had some success in obtaining standing to 
challenge admissions decisions affecting such non-citizens on con-
stitutional grounds, including in the recent travel ban litigation. If 
standing is established, a challenger must still confront the deference 
that the Supreme Court has held is owed to admissions decisions 
under “the political branches’ plenary power over immigration,”123 
provided there is a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for the 
                                                                                                             
 120 See, e.g., Trump, 859 F.3d at 786 n.24 (“The Government also argues that 
to the extent § 1152(a)(1)(A) cabins executive authority, the injunction entered by 
the district court can only apply to immigrant visas and should not apply to nonim-
migrant visas.”). But see id. at 778 (“In prohibiting nationality-based discrimina-
tion in the issuance of immigrant visas, Congress also in effect prohibited nation-
ality-based discrimination in the admission of aliens . . . . [V]isa holders cannot 
be discriminated against on the basis of ‘race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or 
place of residence’ throughout the visa process, whether during the issuance of a 
visa or at the port of entry.”). For references to discrimination in the administra-
tion of immigration policy, see Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immi-
gration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373, 413–14 (2004) (referring to discrimination 
against Muslims after 9/11); CARENS, supra note 9, at 175 (“In the wake of 9/11, 
Muslims found it much harder to gain entry to states in Europe and North Amer-
ica, especially the United States.”). 
 121 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591 (4th Cir. 
2017), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.) (instructing the 
Fourth Circuit to dismiss the challenge as moot). 
 122 See Cox, supra note 120, at 386 (“[C]ourts largely insulate immigration 
laws from constitutional attack by aliens on the ground that they do not have the 
right to seek judicial review of those laws.”). 
 123 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 590. 
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government’s action.124 Unless the challenger can show that the 
government had no legitimate reason for refusing admission or acted 
in bad faith––a showing that the plaintiffs made to the satisfaction 
of the Fourth Circuit in the challenge to the second travel ban125––
then the court will not engage in analysis of whether there has been 
a constitutional violation.126 
These hurdles suggest that in the United States, the constitu-
tional constraints on discrimination in admissions decisions are 
themselves constrained. For example, the standing doctrine implies 
that there is discrimination based on nationality and location embed-
ded within the application of constitutional protections against dis-
crimination: a government decision to refuse to admit a group of 
people because of their religion may not be challengeable if there is 
no impact on someone within the United States.127 Nonetheless, the 
constitutional jurisprudence is still noteworthy because it could be a 
stepping stone toward the development of a domestic jurisprudence 
curtailing discrimination more broadly by the state in admissions 
                                                                                                             
 124 Id. (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)); see also 
Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2139–41 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 125 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 592 (“Based on this evidence, 
we find that Plaintiffs have more than plausibly alleged that EO-2’s stated national 
security interest was provided in bad faith, as a pretext for its religious purpose. 
And having concluded that the ‘facially legitimate’ reason proffered by the gov-
ernment is not ‘bona fide,’ we no longer defer to that reason and instead may ‘look 
behind’ EO-2.” (citing Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
 126 See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770 (“We hold that when the Executive exercises 
this power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, 
the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by 
balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek 
personal communication with the applicant.”); see also Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project, 857 F.3d at 590 (“The government need only show that the challenged 
action is ‘facially legitimate and bona fide’ to defeat a constitutional challenge.” 
(citing Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770)). 
 127 See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 
(2017) (per curiam) (“We grant the Government’s applications to stay the injunc-
tions, to the extent the injunctions prevent enforcement of § 2(c) with respect to 
foreign nationals who lack any bona fide relationship with a person or entity in 
the United States.”). For an analysis of the possible meanings of the majority’s 
per curiam opinion in Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, which empha-
sizes that it is susceptible to multiple interpretations, see Adam Cox, Did the Su-
preme Court Tip Its Hand on How It Will Rule on the Travel Ban?, JUST SECURITY 
(June 26, 2017, 3:11 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/42566/supreme-court-tip-
hand-rule-travel-ban/. 
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decisions. For the time being, however, the state is much freer to 
discriminate in admissions decision-making than operators of public 
accommodations are to decide who may enter their businesses.128 
C. Eminent Domain 
The state’s authority to expropriate land through eminent do-
main is a third kind of restriction on the private landowner’s right to 
exclude.129 Exercising its power of eminent domain, the state may 
expropriate privately owned land for a public purpose provided it 
compensates the landowner.130 When the state does so, it completely 
eviscerates the landowner’s right to exclude because the state forci-
bly acquires the land, regardless of whether the landowner would 
like to sell the land.131 The standard rationale for empowering states 
to use eminent domain is that it is necessary for the state to be able 
to compulsorily acquire land from owners who are abusing their mo-
nopoly power to exclude.132 Think of the landowner whose parcel is 
needed to build a highway but who demands an exorbitant sum from 
the government to transfer the land because they recognize their 
strategic position.133 
There is no comparable right on the part of a foreign state to 
expropriate land in another country. If the United States wanted to 
build a highway through Canada to get to Alaska, there is no legal 
mechanism that would allow the United States to buy out Canadian 
territory or privately owned land within Canada without consent, in 
the same way that the United States could compulsorily purchase 
                                                                                                             
 128 Compare Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766–67, with 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012); 
see also CARENS, supra note 9, 181 (“Germany, Italy, Japan, and a number of 
other states” still give preference to “immigrants with ethnic ties to the dominant 
group(s).”). But see id. at 243 (“[D]espite the general claim to a right to discre-
tionary control over admissions, no democratic state today treats it as morally ac-
ceptable to discriminate (openly) on the basis of race or religion in admissions.”). 
 129 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435–36 
(1982). 
 130 U.S. CONST. amend V; Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Property Is Only 
Another Name for Monopoly, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 51,103 (2017). 
 131 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 41, at 1172; see also Loretto, 458 U.S. 
at 435–36; Posner & Weyl, supra note 130, at 103. 
 132 THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW: TORTS, CONTRACTS, 
PROPERTY, LITIGATION 138 (1997) (“The real justification for eminent domain, 
then, is the need to prevent holdouts . . . .”). 
 133 Id. 
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land if it wanted to build a new highway to link Miami and Al-
bany.134 Arguably, the same monopoly power rationale for empow-
ering states to expropriate land within their borders might suggest 
that states should be allowed to buy land or territory in other coun-
tries without the consent of the foreign owner or power. The land-
seeking state may have a project that will enhance the welfare of the 
international community, or several states in it; the owner or country 
whose land is required may not object to the project, but simply want 
to extract a higher price for the required land or territory. 
The idea that states could compel land transfers by foreign states 
or private landowners in others countries likely will strike most 
readers as a highly objectionable throwback to the era of European 
colonization, when European countries effectively compelled indig-
enous peoples to transfer land and territory.135 But notwithstanding 
our greater sensitivity today to forcible transfers, a few academics 
recently have argued that island countries in the Pacific and the In-
dian Oceans whose land masses may become uninhabitable due to 
climate change should have a right to displace existing countries 
from some of their territory, thereby enabling the countries to reset-
tle and reconstitute themselves.136 These proposals would grant a 
right analogous to eminent domain to states such as Kiribati, Mal-
dives, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu, which Cara 
Nine calls “ecological refugee states.”137 Nine’s rationale for allow-
                                                                                                             
 134 Cf. Waldron, supra note 9, at 473, 479 (“No doubt a state has the respon-
sibility to control its borders against the encroachment of other states . . . . [S]over-
eign S’s control of Freedonia means that sovereign T’s control of Freedonia is 
excluded; and normally Sovereign T may not interfere in what sovereign S does 
with respect to Freedonia.”). 
 135 Cf. STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND 4 (2005) 
(“Whites always acquired Indian land within a legal framework of their own con-
struction. Law was always present, but so was power. The more powerful whites 
became relative to Indians, the more they were able to mold the legal system to 
produce outcomes in their favor—more sales, of larger tracts, at lower prices than 
would have existed had power relationships been more equal.”).  
 136 See Avery Kolers, Floating Provisos and Sinking Islands, 29 J. APPLIED 
PHIL. 333, 340 (2012); Cara Nine, Ecological Refugees, States Borders, and the 
Lockean Proviso, 27 J. APPLIED PHIL. 359, 366 (2010). 
 137 Nine, supra note 136, at 359, 366 (“Tuvalu, the Maldives, and to a certain 
extent, Bangladesh are predicted to be ecological refugee states in the near fu-
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ing ecological refugee states to take territory from other states ap-
plies Locke’s sufficiency proviso to territorial holdings.138 She starts 
from the premise that communities have a right to self-determina-
tion.139 She argues that the allocation of territory to countries ena-
bles them to pursue self-determination.140 If a country’s land mass 
disappears due to climate change, it is entitled to a new territory to 
                                                                                                             
ture.”). “An ecological refugee state is a state whose entire territory is lost to eco-
logical disaster.” Id. at 360. Nine and Kolers do not specify whether the states 
(and the individuals within them) that would be displaced would be compensated. 
Dietrich and Wündisch, on the other hand, contemplate compensation for dis-
placed communities, but they envisage that these communities would volunteer 
to be displaced, rather than forcibly moved for newcomers. See Frank Dietrich & 
Joachim Wündisch, Territory Lost – Climate Change and the Violation of Self-
Determination Rights, 2 MORAL PHIL. & POL. 83, 98 (2015). 
 138 Nine interprets the proviso this way: 
A basic and natural reading of the Lockean proviso, then, is that 
when the holding or acquisition of property rights unnecessarily 
threatens human life, we should change something about prop-
erty dispositions to avoid the unnecessary death caused by these 
property dispositions. The Lockean proviso is a mechanism that 
works within theories of exclusive rights over goods. The 
mechanism works to ensure that the rights do not leave agents 
who are excluded from the goods disadvantaged, in a way rele-
vant to the system of exclusive rights over goods. That is, an 
exclusive right over goods is justified because the right protects 
and promotes some value(s). According to the Lockean proviso 
mechanism, when those value(s) that the right is meant to pro-
tect and promote are threatened by the exercise of the right, then 
the right should be changed so that it no longer undermines 
those values. 
Nine, supra note 136, at 361–62 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 363 (linking 
her interpretation to Locke’s “enough and as good” proviso). Under Nine’s for-
mulation, the Lockean proviso is similar to the right of necessity because both 
generate a right to override existing holdings to preserve life. Jörgen Ödalen, The 
Collective Rights of Environmental Refugees 5 (unpublished first draft), 
http://pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1315/1315968_--dalen_collective-rights-of-envi-
ronmental-refugees.pdf; see also Michael Blake & Mathias Risse, Immigration 
and Original Ownership of the Earth, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
133, 145 (2009) (“In a manner parallel to the Lockean proviso, Common Owner-
ship gives individuals a claim to have exclusion justified to them.” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
 139 Nine, supra note 136, at 359–60. 
 140 Id. at 362. 
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enable it to continue to realize its right to self-determination.141 In 
other words, existing state borders must give way in the face of the 
need of ecological refugee states to reestablish themselves, much as 
the private landowner’s right to exclude is curtailed when an indi-
vidual needs shelter to avoid imminent harm.142 
In addition to thinking of a country taking land from another as 
a collective exercise of the right of necessity, we might, as I sug-
gested above, think of a country taking land from another as analo-
gous to a government using eminent domain to overcome a holdout 
problem.143 We might consider the survival of nation-states as yield-
ing global benefits because individuals derive benefits from mem-
bership in longstanding communities and the existence of a diverse 
array of communities in the world. The states that refuse to yield 
their territory to a state that otherwise would disappear from the 
earth due to climate change might be seen as holdouts, blocking the 
perpetuation of communities whose survival would be globally ben-
eficial.144 Allowing the ecological refugee state to take some of the 
land of another state (or other states) allows the refugee state to over-
come the monopoly/holdout problem that otherwise would block its 
survival.145 Regardless of whether we see the proposals of Nine and 
others that climate-threatened states be allowed to take territory 
from existing states as implementing a collective version of the right 
of necessity or eminent domain, the proposals are animated by the 
same concern that undergirds this essay: climate change necessitates 
revisiting the robust right of states to determine who enters their ter-
ritory.146 
                                                                                                             
 141 See id. at 366. Recognizing that there is no unallocated territory in the 
world, Nine suggests that the ecological refugee state’s claim to new territory 
might be satisfied through “nested self-determination . . . within another state’s 
territory.” Id. at 372; see also Kolers, supra note 136, at 340 (“two states can share 
the same land base while occupying distinct territories”). 
 142 Compare Nine, supra note 136, at 366, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 197 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965). 
 143 Cf. MICELI, supra note 132, at 138. 
 144 See Nine, supra note 136, at 366; see also MICELI, supra note 132, at 138. 
 145 See id. 
 146 See Dietrich & Wündisch, supra note 137, at 83–84, 86–89; Risse, supra 
note 89, at 282–84. 
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IV. THE NORMATIVE QUESTION 
My goal in Part III was to show that the right to exclude does 
not have to be as broad as that currently enjoyed by nation-states. 
Although the right to exclude is central to private property, there are 
important constraints on the landowner’s right to exclude.147 Should 
we now further constrain the right of nation-states to exclude too?148 
For example, should the pockets of protection giving individuals in 
dire straits a right to a safe haven be expanded to something closer 
to the comprehensive right of necessity in property law?149 Should 
state authority to discriminate in admissions decisions be further 
curtailed? And, even more controversially, should countries like the 
ecological refugee states, or an international authority on their be-
half, have the right to expropriate the territory of other states?150  
These ideas are political nonstarters today, but that fact should 
not stop us from analyzing them and others that would reduce the 
discretion of states to control who crosses their borders.151 The cur-
rent division of the earth into states that strictly control their borders 
is a human construct of relatively recent origin,152 and it is not inev-
itable that countries will have a robust right to exclude.153 
                                                                                                             
 147 See supra Part III. 
 148 Cf. Nine, supra note 136, at 366. 
 149 Cf. id. 
 150 Cf. id. 
 151 See CARENS, supra note 9, at 229–30 (explaining how we should consider 
his proposal for open borders even though it is “a nonstarter” politically). 
 152 See TORPEY, supra note 29, at 159 (“Most familiar to and accepted by peo-
ple today is the right of states to control entry, a prerogative that has come to be 
understood as one of the quintessential features of sovereignty. It is important to 
note, however, that the widespread recognition of this prerogative is a fairly recent 
development . . . . [I]n his survey of the international legal opinion prevailing 
during the period immediately preceding the First World War, a German analyst 
of the international passport system, Werner Bertelsmann, was unable to muster 
any consensus for the view that states had an unequivocal right to bar foreigners 
from entry into their territory.”); see also CARENS, supra note 9, at.260, 275, 283 
(referring to division of the world into states with “discretionary control over im-
migration” as a “human construction”). 
 153 See CARENS, supra note 9, at 229–30 (arguing that open borders are what 
justice demands, though conceding that the idea is a “nonstarter” politically to-
day). 
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As recently as the nineteenth century, borders in Western Europe 
and the United States were comparatively open.154 World War I put 
an abrupt end to “the laissez-faire era”155 of immigration in Western 
Europe and the United States, marking the advent of strict enforce-
ment of requirements for passports and visas to cross national 
boundaries in Western Europe and into the United States.156 Re-
strictions on entry increased after World War I.157 The United States 
had already started limiting Chinese immigration in the 1880s.158 In 
the 1920s, Congress legislated the racially discriminatory national-
origins quota regime to curtail southern and eastern European im-
migration and bar Asian immigration.159 
In the decades after World War II, the pendulum swung the other 
way toward greater openness.160 Western European countries re-
                                                                                                             
 154 See TICHENOR, supra note 29, at 2, 11, 12, 48–49, 60, 67–69, 293 (“Save 
for the fleeting Alien and Sedition Acts, the national government embraced an 
essentially laissez-faire approach to immigration for many decades after the 
founding. Immigration reforms of the late-nineteenth century brought both sweep-
ing Chinese exclusion policies and limited screening of other immigrant groups; 
entry for most white European newcomers remained unfettered at the close of the 
Gilded Age.” (footnote omitted)); TORPEY, supra note 29, at 91–99, 105–07, 115, 
121, 159; Schuck, supra note 36, at 2, 7. Before immigration policy was nation-
alized in the United States in the nineteenth century, states regulated immigration, 
although their regulations were not especially restrictive of European immigra-
tion. See TICHENOR, supra note 29, at 46, 52, 58–59, 67; see also Gerald L. Neu-
man, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1833, 1834, 1837, 1841–84 (1993).  
 155 TORPEY, supra note 29, at 117 (quoting ALAN DOWTY, CLOSED BORDERS: 
THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 83 (1987)). 
 156 Id. at 111–21. In the United States, the Passport Control Act of 1918 re-
quired aliens “to first obtain a visa from American consuls or accredited repre-
sentatives abroad” before arriving at “American immigration stations.” 
TICHENOR, supra note 29, at 153–54. Initially intended as a wartime measure to 
protect the United States from “enemy agents,” the “consular inspections and visa 
requirements” were retained after World War I. Id. at 154. “The 1924 Quota Act 
mandated on a permanent basis that all European immigrants obtain an entry visa 
and pass a consular inspection overseas prior to their embarkation to the United 
States.” Id. at 155. 
 157 See TORPEY, supra note 29, at 111. 
 158 See TICHENOR supra note 29, at 106–107. 
 159 See id. at 144–46, 171. 
 160 See TORPEY, supra note 29, at 143–57. 
458 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:425 
 
verted to opening their borders, at least to fellow Western Europe-
ans.161 In the 1960s, the United States abolished the national origins 
system and replaced it with a regime that significantly increased im-
migration, and brought immigrants from Asia, South America, and 
the Caribbean.162 Although it is always risky to characterize the 
times in which you live, we now seem to be in a period of retreat, 
returning to more restrictive approaches to immigration. Britain’s 
vote to exit the European Union may curtail movement in Europe;163 
the Trump Administration is seeking to restrain legal (as well as un-
documented) immigration to the United States, perhaps by half.164 
Nevertheless, the current preoccupation with restricting immigra-
tion flows should not blind us to the possibility that people could be 
able to move more freely across national borders in the future.165 As 
recently as 1980, another Republican, Ronald Reagan, supported the 
free movement of workers (as well as goods and services) between 
the United States, Canada, and Mexico;166 this vision was partially 
implemented by his successors in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, which created greater cross-border employment mobil-
ity for professionals.167 
                                                                                                             
 161 Id. at 144–45, 152–53 (referring to Schengen Accords of 1985), 155. 
 162 TICHENOR, supra note 29, at 215–16, 218–19. But see Schuck, supra note 
36, at 13 (noting limits imposed by 1965 reform and 1978 changes). 
 163 See WILL SOMERVILLE, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., WHEN THE DUST 
SETTLES: MIGRATION POLICY AFTER BREXIT (2016), http://www.migrationpol-
icy.org/news/when-dust-settles-migration-policy-after-brexit. 
 164 See Baker, supra note 2. 
 165 See, e.g., Frank Jordans, Merkel Stands by Her 2015 Decision to Open 




 166 TICHENOR, supra note 29, at 255 (“During his 1980 presidential campaign, 
Reagan endorsed the notion of a North American free trade zone in which goods, 
services, technology, and workers could move freely across U.S., Canadian, and 
Mexican borders. Key members of the campaign team recall that Reagan, who 
had strong ties to California growers, originally was persuaded that the best way 
to redress illegal immigration was to create an open border with Mexico.”). 
 167 TN NAFTA Professionals, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://
www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/tn-nafta-professionals 
(last updated Mar. 7, 2017). 
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The status quo—under which states enjoy a robust right to ex-
clude—has already prompted well-established critiques.168 For ex-
ample, prominent political theorist Joseph Carens argues that justice 
requires “open borders” with some limited caveats to protect na-
tional security, public order, the welfare state, and perhaps even na-
tional cultures.169 His arguments are rooted in commitments to free-
dom and equality.170 According to Carens, the freedom to move 
across borders is a human right, regardless of whether the borders 
are intra- or inter-state.171 Carens further argues that open borders 
would reduce inequalities and promote equality of opportunity.172 
There are also well-established defenses of robust national rights to 
exclude, many of which Carens addresses in defending his argument 
that justice favors open borders.173 Some argue that “justice is pri-
marily about relationships inside the state.”174 Michael Walzer fa-
mously argues that national control of admissions decisions is a pre-
condition for “communities of character.”175 Carens also recognizes 
arguments that such control is necessary to enable countries to real-
ize their right to self-determination,176 to give priority to one’s com-
patriots,177 or to protect national security, public order, the welfare 
state, or national cultures.178 
I do not want to revisit the debate about whether national borders 
should be open. Rather, my argument is that the needs for greater 
human mobility that climate change will generate should prompt us 
to rethink the robustness of the right to exclude that states currently 
enjoy. The current state of affairs, where states enjoy virtually un-
                                                                                                             
 168 See, e.g., CARENS, supra note 9, at 276–86. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 233. 
 171 Id. at 237. 
 172 Id. at 234. He concedes that freedom to move across national borders by 
itself will not be sufficient to promote global distributive justice because the poor 
may not be well-positioned to move. Thus, he also supports significant reductions 
in “international inequalities.” Id. 
 173 Id. at 270–83. 
 174 Id. at 256 (referring to this objection to open borders, but rejecting it). 
 175 WALZER, supra note 51, at 62; see also CARENS, supra note 9, at 261–62 
(quoting same passage). 
 176 CARENS, supra note 9, at 262. 
 177 Id. at 273. 
 178 Id. at 276–87. 
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constrained authority to exclude others, emerged in a specific phys-
ical context.179 But climate change is already altering, and will con-
tinue to alter, the current context in important respects.180 In this new 
climate, some of the arguments against freedom of movement are 
recast in a different light and may actually favor a greater permea-
bility of national borders, if not completely open borders.181 
Globally, climate change will alter the areas of the earth that are 
conducive to human habitation, and consequently where people will 
live.182 Many low-lying coastal areas likely will become uninhabit-
able due to sea-level rise in the absence of investments in expensive 
infrastructure to protect their coastlines. As already mentioned, 10% 
of the world’s population lives in low-lying coastal areas, “with a 
larger share of the population (14%) in developing countries living 
in [such] area[s] compared to more developed regions.”183 Other cli-
mate stressors, such as temperature increase, will make it difficult 
for humans to live in other types of environments.184 For example, a 
2016 article concludes that due to projected temperature increases, 
the Middle East and North Africa, which is home to “about 550 mil-
lion people,”185 “is a climate change hotspot that could turn into a 
scorching area in the summer.”186 Under a scenario where green-
house gas emissions continue to rise in this century, “part of the 
[Middle East and North Africa] may become uninhabitable for some 
species, including humans.”187 People affected by sea-level rise and 
                                                                                                             
 179 See TORPEY, supra note 29, at 117–21. 
 180 See MARTIN, supra note 24, at 3. 
 181 See Richard Black et al., Migration as Adaptation, 478 NATURE 447, 448–
49 (2011); see also CARENS, supra note 9, at 225–54. 
 182 See MARTIN, supra note 24, at 2–5. 
 183 Curtis & Schneider, supra note 22, at 29 (citing McGranahan et al., supra 
note 22, at 17, 25–26; O’NEILL ET AL., supra note 22, at 26–27). 
 184 See Lelieveld et al., supra note 25, at 245–47; see also MARTIN, supra note 
24, at 3 (analyzing “four paths . . . by which environmental change may affect 
migration either directly, or, more likely, in combination with other factors: 
[l]onger-term drying trends[,] . . . [r]ising sea levels[,] . . . [w]eather-related acute 
natural hazards, [and] . . . [c]ompetition over natural resources”). 
 185 Lelieveld et al., supra note 25, at 247. 
 186 Id. at 257. 
 187 Id. (citing Jeremey S. Pal & Elfatih A.B. Eltahir, Future Temperature in 
Southwest Asia Projected to Exceed a Threshold for Human Adaptability, 6 
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 197, 197 (2016)). Pal and Eltahir conclude that, if 
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other consequences of climate change may not move across an in-
ternational boundary; experience suggests that people who move 
due to environmental change often move internally within their 
home countries.188 People also likely will try to avoid moving, given 
the human preference for remaining in place.189 But some people 
will need to move across national borders.190 It is therefore not sur-
prising that research focusing on the implications of climate change 
on migration sometimes argues explicitly for greater freedom of 
movement between countries as well as within them.191 Climate 
                                                                                                             
emissions continue to rise under a business-as-usual-scenario, “[a] plausible anal-
ogy of future climate for many locations in Southwest Asia is the current climate 
of the desert of Northern Afar on the African side of the Red Sea, a region with 
no permanent human settlements owing to its extreme climate.” Pal & Eltahir, 
supra note 187, at 199. For a thought-provoking analysis of the implications of 
sea-level rise for UNESCO world heritage sites, and the land masses of different 
countries over a 2000-year period, see Ben Marzeion & Anders Levermann, Loss 
of Cultural World Heritage and Currently Inhabited Places to Sea-Level Rise, 9 
ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 4–6 (2014). On the other hand, “climate change might 
result in northern lands in Canada, Russia and Greenland that are currently 
sparsely populated, becoming more hospitable environments.” Allan M. Findlay, 
Migrant Destinations in an Era of Environmental Change, 21S GLOBAL ENVTL. 
CHANGE S50, S52 (2011). 
 188 See MARTIN, supra note 24, at 2 (“Given that most movements are likely 
to be within countries, much of the attention to date has focused legitimately on 
internal migration, and policymakers have paid particular attention to adaptation 
policies that reduce the need for individuals to move out of harm’s way, or alter-
natively, involve internal mobility as an adaptation strategy that allows house-
holds to cope with environmental changes.”). For articles warning that it is im-
portant not to exaggerate the international migration that will result from climate 
change, especially the migration from developing to developed countries, see 
Findlay, supra note 187, at S52; Black et al., supra note 181, at 448–49. 
 189 See Hugo, supra note 17, at S29 (“In situ adaptations are by far the most 
common responses to demographic and environmental changes.”); Findlay, supra 
note 187, at S53 (“Rootedness and immobility are dominant features of the mobil-
ity literature . . . .”). 
 190 See MARTIN, supra note 24, at 2. 
 191 See Black et al., supra note 181, at 448–49 (“Migration may be the most 
effective way to allow people to diversify income and build resilience where en-
vironmental change threatens livelihoods. It is therefore necessary to make chan-
nels for voluntary migration available. Within countries, this implies removing 
arbitrary restrictions on movement, and providing basic infrastructure to enable 
relocation and resettlement in urban areas, ideally sustainably. Internationally, 
this might include the extension of regional economic communities to cover the 
free movement of people as well as money and goods.”); Findlay, supra note 187, 
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change will impact not only the people in regions highly vulnerable 
to its consequences, such as coastal areas, but also those living in 
the destination areas to which displaced people will seek to move.192 
Earlier, I suggested that there are two important categories of 
arguments for countries having robust rights to exclude, both of 
which mirror the arguments for giving private landowners a right to 
exclude: identity-based and prudential arguments.193 
A. The Identity-Based Arguments in the New Climate 
Consider how climate change gives rise to identity-based argu-
ments for limiting, rather than maintaining, the rights of states to 
exclude foreigners. As mentioned above, climate change threatens 
the continued existence of several small island nations in the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans.194 These are low-lying countries that are ex-
pected to become uninhabitable due to flooding from rising sea lev-
els, the destruction of their sources of freshwater from “saltwater 
intrusion,” and the destruction of infrastructure in more frequent and 
more extreme weather events related to climate change.195 As dis-
                                                                                                             
at S57 (“Rather than being concerned with forced environmental mobility, per-
haps a greater concern for policy makers should be the inability of the most vul-
nerable populations to adapt to climate change in situ. The resistance of wealthier 
nations to consider international mobility alternatives for these groups is in many 
ways very problematic.”); Hugo, supra note 17, at S31 (“[T]here will be increas-
ingly stark contrasts between labour shortage and labour surplus countries. There 
is an urgent need for an international migration regime which recognises this re-
ality and provides a basis for safe, effective and equitable migration from low 
income countries to meet the needs of high income countries. Effects of climate 
change may be factored in to the development of such a regime. The fact is that 
demographic differences, quite apart from other drivers, mean that there will be 
significant labour shortages in high income countries. In providing this labour, 
can low income areas and countries which are facing the greatest threat of nega-
tive climate change impact be given special consideration as source areas for mi-
grants?”). 
 192 See Hauer, supra note 21, at 324; see also Curtis & Schneider, supra note 
22, at 46–49. 
 193 See supra Part I. 
 194 See Risse, supra note 89, at 281–82. 
 195 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE-
RELATED RISKS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 4–5 (2015), http://archive.de-
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cussed above, Nine argues that if we take seriously the right of na-
tional self-determination, these “ecological refugee states” have a 
right to territory within the borders of existing states to reconstitute 
themselves.196 Without explicitly saying so, Nine recasts self-deter-
mination as an argument for curtailing the right to exclude, rather 
than preserving it.197 Instead of saying that nations have a right to 
self-determination and that this right grounds a right to exclude for-
eigners—as Walzer argues, for example198—Nine is arguing that the 
right of self-determination justifies undermining the territorial in-
tegrity of existing states in the new context of climate change.199 
Although Nine does not make this argument explicitly, one 
might also say that the threatened island nations have a right to ter-
ritory to protect their national cultures.200 This would transform pre-
serving national cultures from an argument for national control over 
borders to an argument for undermining the right of existing nations 
to exclude.201 Walzer’s argument that protecting “communities of 
character” requires giving states the right to define their membership 
would similarly be transformed into an argument for undermining 
the right of states to refuse entry to foreigners.202 The threatened is-
land nations—unable to protect their existing communities of char-
acter within their existing land masses—would presumably have 
rights to persist on territory that currently belongs to other countries 
for the sake of preserving those communities of character.203 Walzer 
himself seems to recognize that when territory is fully allocated, 
countries’ rights to exclude might be overridden and that countries 
with plentiful land may be required to cede some of it to those in 
                                                                                                             
fense.gov/pubs/150724-congressional-report-on-national-implications-of-cli-
mate-change.pdf?source=govdelivery; see also Curtis & Schneider, supra note 
22, at 31–41. 
 196 See Nine, supra note 136, at 366. 
 197 See id. at 361–62. 
 198 See WALZER, supra note 51, at 42–46. 
 199 See Nine, supra note 136, at 366. 
 200 Cf. id. at 362 (“Essentially, territorial rights establish a practical foundation 
upon which a group can exercise its right to self-determination . . . . For a group 
to be self-determining, they must have some sense of internal identity that is 
uniquely advanced by the self-determining powers of the group.”). 
 201 Compare CARENS, supra note 9, at 283–87, with Nine, supra note 136, at 
366. 
 202 Cf. WALZER, supra note 51, at 62. 
 203 Cf. Nine, supra note 136, at 366. 
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need of land—or to grant the “necessitous” membership in their po-
litical communities, an alternative I discuss further below.204 
One possible response to these identity-based arguments for re-
stricting the right to exclude is that they only justify minimal cur-
tailment of the right to exclude to protect the right of self-determi-
nation of the small number of “ecological refugee states,” which 
combined have a population of under 600,000 people.205 Because 
these are the only countries for which climate change presents an 
existential threat, some may argue that these are the only countries 
that should be entitled to acquire territory from existing states and 
thus, no grand relaxation of the right to exclude is required. The dif-
ficulty with this argument is that climate change and its international 
implications are not limited to the small island nations.206 Yes, those 
islands may be the only countries whose entire land masses are vul-
nerable to becoming uninhabitable, but they will not be the only 
countries whose national options and cultures will be fundamentally 
harmed by climate change.207 
Think of Bangladesh, a low-lying country with a population of 
over 160 million;208 it is regarded as one of the countries “most vul-
nerable” to climate change.209 Robert Glennon recently wrote that 
                                                                                                             
 204 WALZER, supra note 51, at 46–48. I am referring to a controversial passage, 
in which Walzer seems to indicate that a country could legitimately pursue a racist 
immigration policy like “the ‘White Australia’ policy” that bans non-white immi-
gration, provided the country was willing to give up some of its territory to the 
individuals that it refused to admit on racist grounds. 
 205 Clare Heyward & Jörgen Ödalen, A New Nansen Passport for the Territo-
rially Dispossessed 17 (Uppsala Universitet, Working Paper No. 3, 2013), 
http://www.statsvet.uu.se/digitalAssets/443/c_443604-l_3-k_2013_3.pdf (“The 
four states most commonly cited as being at risk of submersion, the Maldives, the 
Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu have a combined population of approxi-
mately 576000—less than 1% of the UK’s population.”). 
 206 See Hauer, supra note 21, at 324; see also Curtis & Schneider, supra note 
22, at 46–49. 
 207 See Hauer, supra note 21, at 324; see also Curtis & Schneider, supra note 
22, at 46–49. 
 208 Robert Glennon, The Unfolding Tragedy of Climate Change in Bangla-
desh, SCI. AM.: GUEST BLOG (Apr. 21, 2017), https://blogs.scientificameri-
can.com/guest-blog/the-unfolding-tragedy-of-climate-change-in-bangladesh/. 
 209 IPCC, REPORT ON BANGLADESH LAUNCH OF THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT (AR5) OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
(IPCC), 3 (2014), https://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Report-on-IPCC-
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“[a] three-foot rise in sea level would submerge almost 20 percent 
of the entire country and displace more than 30 million people. 
Some scientists project a five-to-six foot rise by 2100, which would 
displace perhaps 50 million people.”210 While Bangladesh may not 
disappear entirely, perhaps it also should be entitled to additional 
territory from other states to house its large population and limit the 
potentially devastating effects of climate change on its national cul-
ture as well as the right to self-determination of millions of its citi-
zens who stand to become refugees. 
From the opposite perspective, one might argue that the identity-
based arguments are too indeterminate to justify even minimally 
curtailing other states’ rights to exclude, even if done to protect the 
ecological refugee states.211 Displacing one country from some of 
its territory to enable the persistence of an ecological refugee state 
will affect the self-determination and the culture of the state that 
loses part of its territory to the refugee state.212 Doesn’t a “donor” 
state also have a right to self-determination on par with the refugee 
state? Moreover, what metric will be used to determine which coun-
tries are displaced from some of their territory for refugee states? In 
the nineteenth century, as the United States displaced Native Amer-
icans from their lands, Native Americans were faulted for not using 
their lands productively.213 Forcing states to give up some of their 
territory because they are not using it according to some externally 
determined standard would evince a profound disregard for the 
                                                                                                             
outreach-events-Bangladesh-.pdf; cf. Hugo, supra note 17, at S29–31 (discussing 
the vulnerability of the Mekong Delta in Vietnam). 
 210 Glennon, supra note 208; see also Damian Carrington, Climate Change 
Will Stir ‘Unimaginable’ Refugee Crisis, Says Military, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2016, 
1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/dec/01/climate-
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 211 See WALZER, supra note 51, at 50 (“On the one hand, everyone must have 
a place to live, and a place where a reasonably secure life is possible. On the other 
hand, this is not a right that can be enforced against particular host states.”). 
 212 See id. at 44 (“[T]he link between people and land is a crucial feature of 
national identity.”). 
 213 BANNER, supra note 135, at 160 (“Conventional thought about Indians 
changed in the early nineteenth century, as the common perception of the Indian 
gradually transformed from farmer to hunter, and that had the effect of weakening 
support among educated Americans for recognizing Indian property rights.”); see 
also id. at 153, 159, 165, 168, 172–73, 206. 
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rights of those existing states to self-determination and repeat the 
mistakes of colonization. This time, however, the territorial surren-
ders would often be on behalf of descendants of communities that 
Europeans colonized, as a number of the ecological refugee states 
are former colonies.214 Instead of forcing countries to surrender ter-
ritory on the basis that it is under-populated, or insufficiently pro-
ductive, the ecological refugee states or an international body might 
buy territory from existing states on behalf of the refugee states.215 
But, under this approach, the international community would need 
to develop protections to ensure that the communities whose land is 
ceded genuinely consent to the cession and to avoid undermining 
the donor states’ rights to self-determination. 
An underlying issue with the national identity-based arguments 
for limiting the national right to exclude is that these arguments pre-
sume that national identities are worth protecting.216 It may be that 
individuals—not countries, national cultures, or political communi-
ties—should be the focus of concern.217 If so, the right to self-deter-
mination might be reformulated as a right that individuals enjoy to 
be members of a self-defining community in which they can pursue 
their own interests.218 Under this understanding, individuals would 
have a right to be part of a community, though not necessarily their 
community of birth.219 If their community were to scatter because 
                                                                                                             
 214 Wyman, supra note 94, at 440 (“For example, the Maldives was a British 
protected area and then a protectorate from 1796 until it gained independence in 
1965, and earlier the islands were under the influence of the Portuguese and the 
Dutch.”). 
 215 See Dietrich & Wündisch, supra note 137, at 97. Indeed, Kiribati has al-
ready bought land in Fiji in anticipation of eventual resettlement. Laurence Cara-
mel, Besieged by the Rising Tides of Climate Change, Kiribati Buys Land in Fiji, 
GUARDIAN (June 30, 2014, 8:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environ-
ment/2014/jul/01/kiribati-climate-change-fiji-vanua-levu. 
 216 CARENS, supra note 9, at 284–86 (arguing that there are important limits 
on the rights of states to limit immigration to protect national cultures, but noting 
that others go further and reject the goal of protecting cultures). 
 217 See Mathew Lister, Climate Change Refugees, 17 CRITICAL REV. INT’L 
SOC. & POL. PHIL. 618, 627 (2014) (“What is plausibly owed to those displaced 
by climate change is a right, held by individuals, to be able to be full members in 
a polity that respects them and allows them sufficient autonomy.”). 
 218 See id. at 628. 
 219 See id. at 627 (“[R]especting minority rights and protecting the rights of 
the displaced individuals . . . . may all be done without granting new territories to 
governments of no longer inhabitable states.” (footnote omitted)). 
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its land mass disappeared, they would have a right to join another 
community; their original community would not have a right to take 
someone else’s territory and recreate itself there.220 In addition to 
having an individual right to resettle elsewhere and become part of 
another community, individuals might have rights to retain an affin-
ity with the remaining population from their (now deterritorialized) 
home state similar to the way that individuals can have multiple cit-
izenships today.221 This individualistic formulation of the right of 
self-determination still would weaken the right of countries to ex-
clude foreigners, but in a different way as countries would have to 
integrate people who lose their existing communities, not cede ter-
ritory to those disappearing communities.222 
B. Prudential Arguments in the New Climate 
There are also prudential arguments for limiting the right to ex-
clude when people need to change where they live due to climate 
change.223 As mentioned above, a prudential argument for allowing 
countries a wide berth to exclude foreigners is that discretionary na-
tional control over borders incentivizes countries to take care of their 
                                                                                                             
 220 See id. (“[I]t is a non-sequitur to suppose that [the right to a minimally just 
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land mass and citizens.224 Because they can control who crosses 
their borders, countries know that they can keep for themselves the 
benefits of the investments that they make in conserving their soil 
and educating their populations.225 Countries also know that they 
will bear the costs of poor governance because their citizens cannot 
easily move elsewhere due to the right to exclude that all countries 
enjoy.226 These arguments presume that countries will internalize 
the negative and positive consequences of their decisions.227 
Climate change, however, is unlike the national-scale externality 
problems that countries are incentivized to address by the right to 
exclude; it is a global commons problem that no single country can 
mitigate on its own.228 It is the cumulative level of greenhouse gas 
emissions that will determine how much the climate will change, not 
how much any individual country emits.229 The right to exclude does 
not motivate countries to mitigate global externality problems like 
climate change because the ability of country A to exclude foreign-
ers will not enable country A to reap any special rewards from re-
ducing its greenhouse gas emissions that it can deny to others. Even 
if A reduces its emissions, it may remain vulnerable to climate 
change because other countries can continue to emit greenhouse 
gases, possibly at levels that swamp any of the benefits of A’s emis-
sion reductions.230 Moreover, the fact that it is difficult for the citi-
zens of country A to immigrate to country B because of the national 
right to exclude does not provide country A with any stronger in-
centive to reduce its emissions because, as just stated, no matter how 
much country A invests in reducing its greenhouse gas emissions, 
the amount of climate change will be determined by the global 
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amount of greenhouse emissions.231 So, the right to exclude does 
nothing to incentivize countries to address climate change. Indeed, 
the state system may complicate mitigating the effects of climate 
change. With over 190 states, each with the right to exclude foreign-
ers and set the agenda for its territory and population, coordinating 
an international arrangement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
has been difficult.232 
In addition to doing nothing to encourage countries to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions, an unfettered national right to ex-
clude also may make countries more vulnerable to the effects of cli-
mate change.233 When the landscape suitable for human habitation 
is changing, national security and public order might be better pro-
tected if the right to exclude were constrained and it were easier to 
move across national borders. More open borders would enable peo-
ple to more easily escape the “flooding, drought, and higher temper-
atures” that the Department of Defense warned in a 2015 report to 
Congress will multiply the threats facing “fragile states and vulner-
able populations by dampening economic activity and burdening 
public health.”234 Immigration from fragile states might act as a 
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“safety valve” to reduce social tensions and conflicts within those 
states, similar to the way that emigration from Britain to the United 
States (and Canada) did in the nineteenth century.235 In sending 
countries, departures may reduce demands for increasingly scarce 
resources such as land or drinking water;236 immigrants also might 
send remittances back home that could help to diversify the incomes 
of those who remain and help them to adapt to climate change.237 
One argument sometimes made against using immigration to al-
leviate tensions in the sending country is that the safety valve creates 
a risk of moral hazard by reducing the incentives for sending coun-
tries to address the underlying causes of their social tensions.238 In 
the early 1950s, for example, United States officials debated 
whether encouraging defections from Communist countries would 
reduce or increase internal resistance to the Communist govern-
ments.239 But this risk of moral hazard does not apply when climate 
change is exacerbating, or giving rise to, those tensions. Again, be-
cause climate change is a global commons problem resulting from 
the total level of worldwide emissions, this reduces the amount that 
countries can do on their own to reduce their impacts, and so pun-
ishing the victims of climate change by confining them to their home 
countries is not going to lead to less climate change.240 However, 
countries have greater control over the degree to which they adapt 
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to the effects of climate change to the extent that they decide if and 
how to invest in their citizens and infrastructure to promote resili-
ence to the effects of climate change; so one might ask if countries 
will under-invest in adaption if their populations can exit to other 
countries. 
Thus far, I have emphasized how the national security of sending 
countries would be enhanced through more open borders, but in-
creasing immigration is also in the interests of potential receiving 
countries. Receiving countries might benefit economically from the 
immigration.241 Moreover, if there are more legal avenues for or-
derly immigration to receiving countries, they will have the oppor-
tunity to screen immigrants for security and other concerns and 
stand a greater chance of avoiding sudden mass influxes of people 
that overwhelm receiving country resources, like the Syrian refugee 
crisis in Europe.242 Thus, protecting national security and public or-
der, which often are presented today as reasons for closing national 
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borders to immigration,243 actually might be better served in an era 
of climate change by relaxing restrictions on immigration.244 We 
might think of more open borders as an insurance mechanism for 
dealing with the effects of climate change that would provide indi-
viduals in vulnerable countries with a way out and receiving coun-
tries with an orderly way to plan for their integration.245 
C. Other Arguments for Limiting the Right to Exclude 
I have argued that the identity and prudential arguments often 
advanced on behalf of robust national control over immigration sup-
port curtailing the national right to exclude under the changed cir-
cumstances of climate change.246 As a postscript, it is worth noting 
that the longstanding arguments for more open immigration policies 
also continue to be relevant in an era of human induced climate 
change. Carens’s appeals to equality and liberty247 retain their valid-
ity (and their drawbacks), as do the economic arguments that immi-
gration increases economic growth and human welfare.248 
Then there are the existing targeted arguments for selective ex-
ceptions to the national right to exclude. Appeals to necessity sup-
port expanding the protections available to people in imminent dan-
ger, by enlarging upon existing protections for refugees.249 As men-
tioned above, a number of the political theorists who have written 
about climate change and immigration have returned to the principle 
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of necessity in Grotius—and Locke’s sufficiency proviso—to 
ground arguments that countries are morally obligated to admit peo-
ple fleeing their home countries because of climate change.250 Cor-
rective justice also provides some individuals with a claim to be ad-
mitted to a foreign country.251 The theory is that countries whose 
actions put others at risk have an obligation to admit those people to 
their societies.252 After the Vietnam War, American officials felt a 
responsibility to accept Vietnamese refugees; today, there is a spe-
cial refugee program for admitting Iraqis endangered by their work 
with the United States.253 Along these lines, a number of scholars 
argue that countries, especially wealthy developed countries, are 
morally obligated to admit people displaced by climate change 
based on the countries’ histories of greenhouse gas emissions.254 
Strictly construed, these arguments would provide a right to immi-
grate to only those migrants who can prove their migration is at-
tributable to climate change, a tall order given that climate change 
usually will be one of a number of factors behind someone’s deci-
sion to move.255 
                                                                                                             
 250 See Kolers, supra note 136, at 334–340; Nine, supra note 136, at 359, 366; 
Risse, supra note 89, at 282–83. 
 251 See Katrina Miriam Wyman, Responses to Climate Migration, 37 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 167, 191 n.142 (2013) (identifying sources arguing that developed 
countries are obligated to assist climate migrants as a matter of corrective justice). 
 252 See id. at 191–92. 
 253 See CARENS, supra note 9, at 195; LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 239, 
at 113–14, 120, 123; TICHENOR, supra note 29, at 223; BUREAU OF POPULATION, 
REFUGEES, & MIGRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. Refugee Admissions Pro-
gram (USRAP) Direct Access Program for U.S.-Affiliated Iraqis (Mar. 11, 2016), 
https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2016/254650.htm. 
 254 See Peter Penz, International Ethical Responsibilities to ‘Climate Change 
Refugees,’ in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES 151, 161 (Jane McAdam ed., 2010); Sujatha Byravan & Sudhir 
Chella Rajan, The Ethical Implications of Sea-Level Rise Due to Climate Change, 
24 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 239, 243–44 (2010); Eckersley, supra note 229, at 485. 
On immigration benefits as restitution, see generally James Souter, Comment, To-
wards a Theory of Asylum as Reparation for Past Injustice, 62 POL. STUD. 326, 
327, 329, 334–35 (2014). 
 255 See, e.g., Ives, supra note 1.  
474 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:425 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
State sovereigns and private landowners both control access to 
land, but the scope of the state’s right to exclude currently is strik-
ingly broader than that of private landowners.256 This state of affairs 
reflects the political dominance of modern states, which, at least in 
the developed world, have the internal authority to curtail the rights 
of landowners and the external authority to hold foreigners at bay.257 
There are well-articulated arguments, such as Carens’s, that the 
state’s virtually unconstrained authority to exclude foreigners is too 
broad under current conditions.258 Regardless of what we think of 
Carens’s liberty and equality based arguments for open borders, cli-
mate change will strengthen the case that the breadth of the state’s 
current authority to exclude is excessive.259 It will alter the areas that 
are suitable for human habitation and lead to changes in the places 
people live.260 In this new context, the arguments that the right to 
exclude protects self-determination and national security hold less 
sway. Fostering self-determination might require states to give up 
part of their territory or grant citizenship to citizens of other states.261 
Nations also might be better protected against threats to their na-
tional security by creating more legal avenues for immigration, be-
cause these might provide an orderly safety valve for people to leave 
fragile states that lack the resources to adapt to climate change.262 
Still, climate change may not necessitate completely opening na-
tional borders; the constrained nature of the private landowner’s 
right to exclude shows that there are intermediate possibilities be-
tween the largely unconstrained authority to exclude that states cur-
rently enjoy and the elimination of the right to exclude.263 
There is a tension at the heart of the current administration’s ap-
proaches to climate change and immigration: in refusing to join 
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other countries in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the admin-
istration may be undermining the long-term viability of its isolation-
ist immigration agenda. It is true that the right of nations such as the 
United States to exclude may not be relaxed just because the force 
of the arguments for a robust right will diminish as the consequences 
of climate change are felt around the world. As political scientist 
Daniel Tichenor argues in his history of United States immigration 
policy, Americans “remain profoundly ambivalent about immi-
gra[tion],” even though “they have woven immigration narratives 
and iconography into their collective cultural identity.”264 Chinese 
exclusion starting in the nineteenth century, and the national origins 
quota system that endured for four decades from the 1920s to the 
1960s, are some of the more prominent manifestations of that am-
bivalence.265 But the United States and many other countries will 
not easily be able to close themselves off from peoples that will be 
harmed by climate change. 
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